We are publishing a report on the monitoring of cases under the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation.
We attended 129 hearings on 17 cases across 4 regions: Moscow, Moscow Region, Rostov-on-Don, and St. Petersburg. The majority of cases were initiated under Article 207.3 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation.
Download the full version below or read the key findings.
Summary of main points
On February 24, 2022, Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine. On March 4, 2022, the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation was amended with several articles, including Article 207.3 (Public dissemination of knowingly false information about the use of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation) and Article 280.3 (Public actions aimed at discrediting the use of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation for the purpose of protecting the interests of the Russian Federation and its citizens, as well as maintaining international peace and security). These articles are specifically designed to prosecute individuals criticizing the war and the actions of the Russian military. Law enforcement agencies also use other articles of the Criminal Code to target dissent, ranging from property damage (Article 167) and vandalism (Article 214) to high treason (Article 275).
The cases were mostly brought under Article 207.3 of the Criminal Code, when the defendants published posts on various social networks, from YouTube to VKontakte.
Example of a charge when publishing a post:
From March to April 2022, she published several posts about the bombing in Mariupol (which the Defense Ministry denies). Having dislike for Russian servicemen, on April 3, 2022, she made a post about Bucha on the grounds of political hatred. According to the information of the Ministry of Defense, the civilian population is not an object for attack, causing physical harm is not allowed.
Hearing from 24.01.2023
Example of charges under p. 2 of Art. 167 and 318 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation:
Koltsov holds opposition views and is against bringing citizens to administrative liability. He has a negative attitude toward police officers. He devised a criminal plan: purchased gasoline, researched how to make Molotov cocktails, and decided to use them for arson. The vehicles involved had the word “police” written on them. After gathering the necessary components, Koltsev prepared two bottles, hid them in a briefcase, and brought them to Red Square. There were people present, not just law enforcement officers. He approached the vehicles of the National Guard. Inside and around the buses were officers. He threw a bottle at each bus. Despite resisting and attempting to escape, he was apprehended.
Hearing from 10.05.2023
All cases in our monitoring resulted in guilty verdicts. The most lenient sentence was given to Kirill Sergeevich Korolev — 10 months of imprisonment in a settlement colony.
The harshest sentence was imposed on Vladimir Vladimirovich Kara-Murza, who received 25 years of imprisonment in a high-security colony (as the case involved a charge of treason). On August 2, 2024, several defendants, including Kara-Murza, were released as part of a prisoner exchange between Russia and other countries.
Most other convicted individuals are serving their sentences in general and high-security correctional colonies.
All defendants in the cases we monitored are, in our opinion, political prisoners convicted for exercising freedom of speech or assembly. Even in cases where property damage occurred, the imposed sentences were disproportionately severe, serving as a warning to critics of state policies. The very legislation under which they were convicted contradicts Russia’s international human rights obligations, and the trials were conducted with violations of judicial standards.
Judges often displayed bias, ignored complaints of pressure, such as in the cases of Ziza and Vedel (Klokov), and failed to ensure equality between the parties. In more than 40% of hearings, the defense and prosecution were positioned at different distances from the judge. Experts engaged by the prosecution in the cases of Belousov and Yashin violated expert review procedures, yet their conclusions were used as the basis for convictions. In most cases, defendants or their counsel participating via video link faced compromised defense due to poor connection quality.
Defense attorneys frequently encountered difficulties accessing their clients held in pre-trial detention, limiting their ability to prepare for the proceedings. Defense motions were rejected significantly more often than those from the prosecution, while prosecution evidence was rarely questioned. Judges were excessively strict toward defense evidence, forcing the defense to justify the summoning of each witness.
Decisions to close court sessions were made arbitrarily, often based on the formal nature of the charges. The actual reasons for closing the proceedings were not disclosed to the public, and information about such cases was withheld, violating the principle of judicial transparency.
A positive aspect was the organization of broadcast hearings in separate rooms when space was limited, particularly in Moscow courts. However, due to frequent violations of the principle of public access, this did not significantly improve the overall situation. The public and journalists frequently faced obstacles in attending open hearings, including incomplete information on court websites and denial of access under various pretexts.
The monitoring revealed numerous violations of the right to a fair trial in cases of criminal prosecution for anti-war stance.
